Anchor on the selected chain
Person 1 seals tthreshold with a dual-family epoch in this browser. This button asks Midnight Preview to list one native transfer of that digest. A link appears only after the indexer lists it. Nothing here is mainnet.
Midnight Preview · tthreshold · epoch seal
Research note, sealed.
A real FIPS 204 threshold signature is not what this cut produces. This cut seals the research statement so the note cannot be swapped later without breaking both families and the hash chain.
| Layer | What one break is not enough for | Size |
|---|---|---|
| ML-DSA-65 | Forge if lattices hold | 3,309 byte signature |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s | Forge if hashes hold, even if lattices fall | 7,856 byte signature |
| ML-KEM-768 | Read this epoch's wrap without its secret | 1,088 byte ciphertext |
| WOTS-SHA256 | Bind the public objects; SHA-256 steps only | 67 chains, one-time |
A forger has to break two different assumptions. A later leak of one epoch's wrap does not open the next epoch. This is not a new hardness assumption, and it is not a claim that an AGI or a quantum computer cannot attack the code. The cut itself is not a Midnight transaction. A published sample is midnight-epoch.json.