Anchor on the selected chain
Person 1 seals seal with a dual-family epoch in this browser. This button asks Midnight Preview to list one native transfer of that digest. A link appears only after the indexer lists it. Nothing here is mainnet.
Midnight Preview · seal · epoch seal
Seal the bytes in this browser.
Pick files. This browser hashes every byte, then signs that list with a fresh ML-DSA-65 key and a fresh SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s key, wraps a one-epoch key with ML-KEM-768, and binds the public objects with a one-time SHA-256 chain. Download the public seal and hand it to anyone. The secret stays in this tab.
| Layer | What one break is not enough for | Size |
|---|---|---|
| ML-DSA-65 | Forge if lattices hold | 3,309 byte signature |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s | Forge if hashes hold, even if lattices fall | 7,856 byte signature |
| ML-KEM-768 | Read this epoch's wrap without its secret | 1,088 byte ciphertext |
| WOTS-SHA256 | Bind the public objects; SHA-256 steps only | 67 chains, one-time |
A forger has to break two different assumptions. A later leak of one epoch's wrap does not open the next epoch. This is not a new hardness assumption, and it is not a claim that an AGI or a quantum computer cannot attack the code. The cut itself is not a Midnight transaction. A published sample is midnight-epoch.json.